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For decades, we have examined privatization with zeal and rigor. Relegated to 
the margins, however, have been inquiries into privatization’s close cousin: direct 
government market participation. Given the ubiquity of government commercial 
transactions, the political, legal, and economic challenges such transactions engender, 
and the rise of CEO-style elected officials—the Trumps, Bloombergs, and Romneys 
of the world—almost evangelical in their commitment to running government like a 
business, closer study is warranted. 
This Article characterizes direct government market participation as a complicated, 
confusing, and potentially dangerous fusion of sovereign and commercial power. It 
describes how this fusion may undermine markets, aggrandize State power, or do both 
at the same time. It compares the straddling of the sovereign and commercial realms 
with any number of other constitutionally problematic bridging efforts, including those 
to combine executive and legislative; executive and judicial; federal and state; civilian 
and military; church and State; and, of course, private and public powers. Lastly, it 
situates government market participation within its own separation-of-powers 
paradigm—and does so to help rationalize and domesticate the vexing but often 
necessary practice. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Federal, state, and municipal governments are pervasive and increasingly 
relentless market participants. They run businesses, operate banks, own 
companies, license intellectual property, trade in private securities, and buy 
and sell goods and services for themselves and for their beneficiary 
communities. In addition, these governments hire and fire employees and 
contractors, peddle souvenirs, sell and purchase advertising, privately 
fundraise, and lease space in office buildings, libraries and museums, 
laboratories, and even aboard NASA shuttles. 
Government market participation spans the exotic (e.g., government-owned 
venture capital firms, IT startups, and futures markets) and the mundane 
(e.g., postal delivery and passenger railroad services). It is at once as old as 
the Republic itself and as novel as the newest wave of brash CEOs arriving 
on the political stage and pressing to run government more and more like a 
business.1 It entails the use of sovereign instruments, commercial tools, and 
potent combinations of the two. And it infuriates those railing against 
 
1 See generally Jon D. Michaels, Running Government Like a Business . . . Then and Now, 128 
HARV. L. REV. 1152 (2015) [hereinafter Michaels, Running Government Like a Business]; Jon D. 
Michaels, Can Trump’s Cabinet Makeover Work?, CNN (Dec. 17, 2016), http://www.cnn.com/2016/
12/13/opinions/cabinet-boardroom-michaels-opinion/index.html [https://perma.cc/R7S7-AZWL]. 
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creeping socialism while electrifying those hailing the very same initiatives 
as refreshingly entrepreneurial. 
Government market participation has, for some time, operated in the 
shadow of its more prominent and more carefully scrutinized cousin: 
privatization. For years, policymakers, jurists, and scholars have focused on 
privatization—the outsourcing of State responsibilities to private, generally 
commercially oriented actors—seemingly to the neglect of government’s own 
direct and very public market participation.2 Thus, while privatization has 
grabbed headlines3 and become something of a cause célèbre in legal circles,4 
direct commercial government action has itself remained in the background, 
poking out only occasionally—and only then in narrow, discrete contexts.5 
 
2 See generally GOVERNMENT BY CONTRACT: OUTSOURCING AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 1 
(Jody Freeman & Martha Minow eds., 2009); PAUL R. VERKUIL, OUTSOURCING SOVEREIGNTY: 
WHY PRIVATIZATION OF GOVERNMENT FUNCTIONS THREATENS DEMOCRACY AND WHAT 
WE CAN DO ABOUT IT 6 (2007); Gillian Metzger, Privatization as Delegation, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 
1367, 1369 (2003); Jon D. Michaels, Privatization’s Pretentions, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 717, 718 (2010); 
Steven L. Schooner, Contractor Atrocities at Abu Ghraib: Compromised Accountability in a Streamlined, 
Outsourced Government, 16 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 549, 551 (2005); David A. Super, Privatization, 
Policy Paralysis, and the Poor, 96 CAL. L. REV. 393, 395 (2008). This Article’s equation of privatization 
with the outsourcing of State responsibilities is in keeping with the conventions of contemporary 
American legal scholarship, as evidenced by the sources just cited. This conception of privatization 
is, of course, hardly the only one. See generally Daphne Barak-Erez, Three Questions of Privatization, 
in COMPARATIVE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 493, 494-97 (Susan Rose-Ackerman & Peter L. 
Lindseth eds., 2010). 
3 See, e.g., T. Christian Miller, Contractors Outnumber Troops in Iraq, L.A. TIMES, Jul. 4, 2007, 
at A1; James Risen & Mark Mazzetti, Blackwater Guards Tied to Secret CIA Raids, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 
11, 2009, at A1-2; Scott Shane & Ron Nixon, In Washington, Contractors Take on Biggest Role Ever, N.Y. 
TIMES (Feb. 4, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/02/04/washington/04contract.html [https://
perma.cc/32A7-UZY3]. 
4 See, e.g., Filarsky v. Delia, 132 S. Ct. 1657, 1665 (2012) (considering whether a private contractor 
is a state actor); Minneci v. Pollard, 132 S. Ct. 617, 620 (2012) (similar); Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 
534 U.S. 61, 63 (2001) (similar). For the importance of government outsourcing in other jurisdictions, 
see, e.g., HCJ 2605/05 Academic Center for Law and Business v. Minister of Finance (2009) (Isr.) 
http://elyon1.court.gov.il/files_eng/05/050/026/n39/05026050.n39.pdf [https://perma.cc/D7RM-VHVE]; 
Nandini Sundar v. State of Chattisgarh, (2011) 7 SCC 547 (India). 
5 Most studies of government market participation have been narrowly focused in on particular 
institutions, particular events, or discrete legal challenges. For institutional treatments, see DAVID 
E. LILIENTHAL, TVA: DEMOCRACY ON THE MARCH 1 (1944); Jon D. Michaels, The (Willingly) 
Fettered Executive: Presidential Spinoffs in National Security Domains and Beyond, 97 VA. L. REV. 801 
(2011) [hereinafter Michaels, Fettered Executive]. For constitutional considerations, see Ball v. James, 
451 U.S. 355 (1981); Dan T. Coenen, Untangling the Market-Participant Exemption to the Dormant 
Commerce Clause, 88 MICH. L. REV. 395, 397 (1989); Pauline T. Kim, Market Norms and Constitutional 
Values in the Government Workplace, 97 N.C. L. REV. 601, 605 (2016); Adam Shinar, Public Employee 
Speech and the Privatization of the First Amendment, 46 CONN. L. REV. 1, 3 (2013). For event-specific 
inquiries, see ANDREW ROSS SORKIN, TOO BIG TO FAIL: THE INSIDE STORY OF HOW WALL 
STREET AND WASHINGTON FOUGHT TO SAVE THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM—AND THEMSELVES 
392-408 (2010); Benjamin A. Templin, The Government Shareholder: Regulating Public Ownership of 
Private Enterprise, 62 ADMIN. L. REV. 1127, 1185-86 (2010). 
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This Article zeroes in on government market participation. It addresses 
government market participation broadly and generally, identifying, naming, 
and beginning to answer one of the big questions that arises regardless 
whether we are considering the economics of a public postal service, the law 
of free speech on government passenger trains, the politics of special water 
districts, the ethics of government ownership of large, multinational 
businesses, or the architecture of a State-run venture capital firm. Simply 
stated, how should a government market participant juggle and harmonize its 
seemingly conflicting responsibilities as both a sovereign and commercial 
actor? Put slightly differently, how should a government entity—or a 
particular government official—be both regulatory and entrepreneurial at 
once? The rather common manifestations of commercialized sovereignty 
awaken us to a particularly complicated, conflicted, unpredictable, and above 
all powerful State. 
The sovereign–commercial conflicts that I am putting under the 
microscope differ in degree and kind from the ordinary conflicts that 
government officials invariably struggle to resolve. Ordinary—let’s call them 
“sovereign–sovereign”—conflicts arise, for example, when government 
officials have to decide whether to allocate funds for a highway expansion 
or a new subway line. Likewise, ordinary sovereign–sovereign conflicts crop 
up when, in the course of establishing workplace safety standards or 
collective-bargaining codes, government regulators must balance the interests 
of industry and labor. 
Sovereign–commercial conflicts are also different in degree and kind from 
the everyday conflicts that private actors regularly confront. Ordinary—let’s 
call these “commercial–commercial”—conflicts crystalize when businessmen 
and women must decide whether to spend more on R&D or marketing, or 
whether to save those funds for a rainy day. 
Generally speaking, sovereign–commercial conflicts show themselves to 
be different in four ways. First, sovereign–commercial conflicts must be 
managed by balancing and commingling two distinct perspectives or 
orientations—namely, a public-interest orientation (broadly defined), and a 
business orientation (understood in terms of profit maximization). When 
deciding what supplier to use, ought the government choose the supplier 
offering the objectively best price or the one who charges more but does so 
in a manner that advances public aims? That is to say, should the government 
be willing to pay more to suppliers who operate entirely within the United 
States, employ only union labor, or are LEED certified? 
Second, sovereign–commercial conflicts are exacerbated by the use and 
commingling of two distinct sets of tools: the sovereign’s coercive, lawmaking 
and law-enforcing tools, and the commercial actor’s market powers to buy, 
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sell, and trade. Does the government, for instance, use its controlling equity 
shares in a bailed-out automaker to maximize the return on its investment; or 
does the government use those shares to dictate internal corporate 
governance reforms, evading the “hassles” of regulating via legislation or 
administrative rulemaking? 
Third, sovereign–commercial conflicts spread uneasily across two legal 
regimes—the regime that attaches to and regulates State personnel, and the 
regime that regulates those engaged in private commerce. This uneasy 
straddling prompts one to ask: should a government official abide by 
constitutional or corporate standards (or both) when, say, disciplining or 
terminating someone in her employ? 
Fourth, sovereign–commercial conflicts entail the traversing of unfamiliar 
and at times hostile domains. Specifically, the government’s branching out 
into commercial domains may offend classically liberal sensibilities about 
the proper (that is, limited) role and reach of the State. Similarly, a 
business’s government-like regulatory ambitions—think Google, Facebook, 
or Uber—may offend democratic sensibilities about the proper (also limited) 
role and reach of the market,6 thus making any effort to juggle or harmonize 
dual commercial and sovereign responsibilities that much more problematic. 
Of course, resolving any number of pure public policy (sovereign–sovereign) 
challenges, or pure private ordering (commercial–commercial) challenges, is 
often terribly difficult. They involve hard choices, require considerable 
sacrifice, and invariably alienate those whose positions did not carry the day. 
Yet those conflicts are an analytical and legal cakewalk compared to many 
sovereign–commercial conflicts. 
After all, the fusion of the sovereign and commercial creates a seeming 
institutional mismatch, a misalignment of institutional architecture, 
programmatic goals, and laws. Government regulatory agencies are ill-suited 
to be effective instruments of commerce; and government corporations (and 
other architecturally commercialized government offices) cannot be expected 
to be particularly democratic instruments of sovereign regulatory policy. 
This fusion invites public self-dealing.7 Commercially oriented sovereigns 
might misappropriate sovereign guises, tools, and resources, using the levers 
 
6 See, e.g., Anupam Chander, Facebookistan, 90 N.C. L. REV. 1807, 1811 (2012) (characterizing 
several internet firms as having the “breadth, capital, and power to challenge governments as 
alternative authorities”); Alina Tugend, Barred from Facebook, and Wondering Why, N.Y. TIMES 
(Sept. 19, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/20/your-money/kicked-off-facebook-and-
wondering-why.html [https://perma.cc/KS37-TXXL] (“[T]he large social media companies have a 
governmentlike ability to set social norms.”) (quoting ACLU attorney Lee Rowland). 
7 To be clear, I’m not suggesting anything remotely akin to graft, corruption, or any other 
conferral of private, personal benefits on government officials, though surely government market 
participation increases opportunities for such private self-dealing as well. 
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of regulation to pursue commercial aims (in a manner that gives the 
government a considerable market advantage over nongovernmental actors 
operating in that same commercial space). 
And, conversely, this fusion endangers limited, democratic government. 
Public-regarding commercialized sovereigns might misappropriate commercial 
tools and resources, using them to regulate businesses and industries more 
forcefully, expansively, or expediently than could a noncommercialized 
sovereign entrusted with only democratic and bureaucratic tools. 
The study of commercialized, entrepreneurial government is a big and 
weighty undertaking. This Article starts things off by contending that 
conflicted sovereign–commercial government should not be understood as a 
particularly nettlesome subset of public policy or private ordering challenges 
that we regularly endure, if not eagerly embrace as opportunities to test our 
leaders’ mettle. Rather, sovereign–commercial government should be seen as 
raising structural constitutional concerns in keeping with those that our 
multidimensional systems of separation of powers are designed to address. 
That is to say, our overriding constitutional and normative commitments to 
the “separations of powers”—not just among the three branches and between 
the federal and state governments but also across the public–private divide, 
the church–State divide, and even within agencies8—should extend to 
government market participation. Indeed, viewing the sovereign–commercial 
conflict through the lens of our separations of powers provides an analytical 
framework, normative urgency, and set of legal analogies and precedents for 
studying and policing government market participation. At the very least, 
insisting on some separation—by, for instance, disaggregating regulatory and 
commercial duties and power—can help place government market 
participation on firmer footing at a moment when, seemingly, the practices 
are becoming more and more expansive. 
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I identifies and discusses examples 
of government market participation. These largely stylized case studies capture 
the diversity of issues, institutions, and personnel involved in government 
market participation. Part II considers why sovereign–commercial conflicts 
are less like ordinary sovereign–sovereign or commercial–commercial 
conflicts and instead are more like those that animate our multiple and 
overlapping separations of powers. Part III locates the conflicted government 
market participant within its own separation-of-powers framework and 
sketches out a regulatory plan to address sovereign–commercial conflicts. 
 
8 I explore these secondary lines of separation elsewhere. Jon D. Michaels, Separation of Powers 
and Centripetal Forces: Implications for the Institutional Design and Constitutionality of Our National-
Security State, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. 199 (2016) [hereinafter Michaels, Centripetal Forces]. 
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To be clear, this foray into government market participation is a 
conceptual one—and one that covers only so much ground. Left to the side 
are historical accounts relating past practices, explaining why the government 
finds itself in some markets (and not in others), and recounting when, how, 
and by what criteria some services became commercialized. Left to the side 
too is a normative treatment of commercialized or entrepreneurial 
government. Those explorations must be held over for another day. 
I. THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF GOVERNMENT MARKET PARTICIPATION 
Government market participation appears dull—a workman-like, 
inescapable, and seemingly unproblematic byproduct of sovereign governing. 
Yet appearances can be deceiving: government market participation lies at the 
very core of what government does, how it operates, and how it is perceived 
by lawmakers and regulators, lay observers, scholars, jurists, and business 
executives alike. 
First, over the past few decades, calls to run government like a business 
have become increasingly loud and unabashed. Everywhere, we encounter 
politicians and pundits waxing enviously at the apparent leanness, creativity, 
bravado, and dexterity of American businesses.9 Lest one think this is 
principally a partisan project—associated with Republicans such as 
President Donald Trump and Governors Mitt Romney and Rick Scott—it 
was Al Gore who, as Bill Clinton’s Vice President, penned a path-breaking 
and agenda-setting report titled Businesslike Government: Lessons Learned from 
America’s Best Companies.10 And it was Team Clinton–Gore which lent 
considerable bipartisan, technocratic credence and respectability to the 
initially right-wing, businesslike government movement.11 
Proponents of businesslike government often take the additional step of 
urging legislators and regulators to seek out and capitalize on commercial 
 
9 See RONALD KESSLER, A MASTER OF CHARACTER: INSIDE THE WHITE HOUSE OF 
GEORGE W. BUSH 277 (2004); Greg Allen, Gov. Scott, Ex-CEO, Aims to Run Fla. Like a Business, 
NPR (Jan. 6, 2011), http://www.npr.org/2011/01/06/132684525/rick-scott-floridas-outsider-is-now-in-
office [https://perma.cc/MRP8-6ESJ]; Sean Illing, Save Us from GOP Businessmen!, SALON (June 1, 
2015), http://www.salon.com/2015/06/01/save_us_from_gop_businessmen_donald_trump_carly_
fiorina_mitt_romney_and_the_big_lie_about_big_business/[https://perma.cc/RA47-LYHT]. 
10 AL GORE, BUSINESSLIKE GOVERNMENT: LESSONS LEARNED FROM AMERICA’S BEST 
COMPANIES 3 (1997). Vice President Gore was evidently very much influenced by the writings of 
David Osborne and Ted Gaebler. DAVID OSBORNE & TED GAEBLER, REINVENTING 
GOVERNMENT: HOW THE ENTREPRENEURIAL SPIRIT IS TRANSFORMING THE PUBLIC 
SECTOR (1993). 
11 See JON D. MICHAELS, CONSTITUTIONAL COUP: PRIVATIZATION’S THREAT TO THE 
AMERICAN REPUBLIC 100-18 (2017) [hereinafter MICHAELS, CONSTITUTIONAL COUP] (describing 
how Bill Clinton and Al Gore effectively co-opted the businesslike government reform agenda, 
converting the starkly ideological movement into a technocratic exercise in smarter government). 
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opportunities, rather than simply and somewhat reluctantly engage in commerce 
as needs and circumstances so dictate. They further encourage dealmaking and 
negotiated settlements rather than command-and-control regulations.12 
Second, challenging economic conditions coupled with a fervently anti-
tax political culture have contributed to considerable fiscal and budgetary 
shortfalls at the federal, state, and local levels. As such, it appears to be a 
particularly opportune moment for State entrepreneurialism.13 
Third, and related to the two claims immediately above, trust in 
government is at a nadir. We live at a time when attacks on government 
bureaucracy are at a fevered pitch.14 With a presidential administration 
committed to “deconstruct[ing] the administrative state,”15 with the 
fomenting of fears of a subversive “Deep State,”16 and with calls to “drain the 
swamp”17 reverberating from Main Street to Wall Street to K Street, more 
and more are viewing government as hostile to free enterprise.18 Under these 
challenging, even hostile, conditions, it is perhaps not surprising that 
 
12 Cf. Steven M. Davidoff & David Zaring, Regulation by Deal: The Government’s Response to the 
Financial Crisis, 61 ADMIN. L. REV. 463, 536-37 (2009). 
Already we have seen Donald Trump attempting to play the role of presidential dealmaker. As 
President-elect, Trump engaged in personal negotiations to keep the industrial giant Carrier from 
downsizing domestic operations and outsourcing jobs to Mexico. See Nelson D. Schwartz, Mix of 
Threat and Incentive Sealed a Deal, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2, 2016, at A1. And, within his first few weeks 
in office, the President hashed out some undisclosed deal with the aerospace titan Lockheed-Martin 
to lower the price of its newest F-35 fighter jets. See Christopher Drew, Lockheed Lowers F-35 Price, 
After Prodding by President, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 4, 2017, at B5. 
13 See OSBORNE & GAEBLER, supra note 10, at 196-97. 
14 See Jon D. Michaels, An Enduring, Evolving Separation of Powers, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 515, 
583-85 (2015) [hereinafter Michaels, Enduring, Evolving] (describing the extensive, often unsparing 
attacks on government bureaucracy and government workers in the 2000s and 2010s). 
15 Philip Rucker & Robert Costa, Bannon Vows a Daily Fight for “Deconstruction of the Administrative 
State,” WASH. POST (Feb. 23, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/top-wh-strategist-vows-
a-daily-fight-for-deconstruction-of-the-administrative-state/2017/02/23/03f6b8da-f9ea-11e6-bf01-
d47f8cf9b643_story.html [https://perma.cc/GKG7-DVVF]. 
16 Jon D. Michaels, Trump and the “Deep State,” FOREIGN AFF. (Sept.–Oct. 2017), 
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2017-08-15/trump-and-deep-state?cid=soc-tw-rdr [https://
perma.cc/728C-C8VM]. 
17 James Freeman, Could Trump Really Be Draining the Swamp?, WALL ST. J. (Jun. 30, 2017), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/could-trump-really-be-draining-the-swamp-1498850264 [https://perma.
cc/NYE7-499U]; K. Riva Levinson, Drain the Swamp? Federal Workers Dedicate their Careers to Service, 
HILL (Apr. 2, 2017), http://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/the-administration/326756-drain-the-
swamp-americas-dedicated-workforce-is-not-a [https://perma.cc/YD5G-KZH4]. 
18 See, e.g., Jon D. Michaels & Rajesh D. Nayak, Do It Yourself: Trump’s Quiet Attack on the 
Regulatory State Is Another Part of His Broader Class War, SLATE (Dec. 22, 2017), http://www.slate.
com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2017/12/trump_s_quiet_attack_on_the_regulatory_
state_is_another_part_of_his_broader.html [https://perma.cc/2GJY-STYS] (capturing the Trump 
Administration’s efforts to frame government regulation as a threat to jobs and liberty). 
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governments at all levels are quick to demonstrate their commercial, 
entrepreneurial leanings.19 
Consider, among other things, the Department of Interior’s dual efforts 
to scale back on the size of national monuments (and thus reduce the scope 
of environmental and ecological safeguards) and to significantly raise the 
admission fees at some of the most popular national parks.20 Consider too the 
pivot in many jurisdictions in favor of policing via civil forfeiture (a huge but 
highly controversial revenue raiser) and away from traditional and quite 
costly criminal prosecution.21 
This present-day rejection of government as special and distinct from the 
market seemingly invites and encourages sovereign–commercial conflicts and 
desensitizes us to the potentially State-aggrandizing and market-destabilizing 
effects of such government market participation. We are desensitized both 
because we see commercialized forms of government as part of our “new 
normal” and also because we are less committed to big, welfarist, and 
implicitly non-commercialized forms of government. 
Appreciative, therefore, of the timeliness, urgency, and perhaps changed 
character of government market participation in an increasingly neoliberal 
twenty-first century, this Part offers a few, brief illustrations and composite 
sketches intended to illuminate some of the central and pressing challenges 
that arise when a single government department or unit possesses conflicting 
regulatory and entrepreneurial objectives. 
Government as Self-Regulator. Amtrak, formally known as the National 
Railroad Passenger Corporation, is a for-profit government corporation 
charged with operating the nation’s intercity passenger rail system. As both a 
sovereign and commercial enterprise, it recently found itself in the unusual 
situation of having to compete in and regulate the rail transportation industry.22 
Should Amtrak regulate in an entirely disinterested fashion, even if such 
regulation results in the hamstringing of passenger transportation and thereby 
 
19 This push indeed dates back to the Clinton–Gore years, when, again, entrepreneurial 
government was pitched as an antidote to Americans’ frustration with the welfare state. See generally 
OSBORNE & GAEBLER, supra note 10. 
20 See Bartholomew D. Sullivan, Trump’s Interior Secretary Wants to End Logging, Fishing Bans on 
Some National Monuments, USA TODAY (Sept. 18, 2017), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/
politics/2017/09/18/interior-secretary-ryan-zinke-recommends-altering-several-national-monuments-
allowing-commercial-use/677583001/ [https://perma.cc/5TGB-64AS]; Lauren Katz, The National 
Park Service Wants to Triple the Entrance Fee at Some of its Parks, VOX (Oct. 27, 2017), https://
www.vox.com/energy-and-environment/2017/10/26/16543124/national-park-service-entrance-fee-
increases [https://perma.cc/U5SA-NME5]. 
21 See infra notes 40–41 and accompanying text. 
22 For details of Amtrak’s competing obligations, see Ass’n of Am. R.Rs. v. U.S. Dep’t of 
Transp., 821 F.3d 19, 23 (D.C. Cir. 2016). 
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endangers profits? Or should the railroad regulate in a commercially self-serving 
fashion, at the risk of impartial, trustworthy public administration?23 
Government Equity Ownership. As part of the federal bailouts in 2008 and 
2009, the U.S. government effectively assumed control over key automotive 
and insurance firms.24 Should the government act as a corporate fiduciary, 
using its equity control to prioritize shareholder profits; a public fiduciary, 
maximizing returns on the taxpayers’ “investment;” a global regulator, 
seeking to stabilize markets at home and abroad; or as a domestic, partisan 
regulator, extracting what the Obama Administration may have seen as 
overdue and otherwise politically unattainable industrial regulatory reforms 
such as caps on executive compensation and greater firm attentiveness to 
environmental and labor considerations?25 
Government as Investor. American governments at all levels and across many 
jurisdictions oversee countless pension funds. When investing those funds, 
should government managers acquire stock in firms expected to produce the 
highest rates of return (irrespective of the characteristics, conduct, or location 
of those firms)? Or should they buy stock in “socially responsible” firms or in 
local firms employing many constituents, even if the pension managers foresee 
that those politically attractive firms will be less profitable?26 
Managerial Government. When a government supervisor seeks to 
discipline one of her regular employees, should she be bound by the First 
Amendment? Or ought we credit the claim that the supervisor is acting in a 
managerial or proprietary (and not sovereign) capacity? In other words, is the 
employer–employee relationship sufficiently commercial in look and feel to 
displace the otherwise applicable sovereign–citizen relationship so carefully 
regulated by the Constitution?27 
 
23 Somewhat surprisingly given the trends favoring greater government market participation, 
the D.C. Circuit in 2016 struck down Amtrak’s dual authority, a decision seemingly in keeping with 
the claims this Article makes. Id. 
24 See generally Davidoff & Zaring, supra note 12. 
25 See Barbara Black, The U.S. as “Reluctant Shareholder”: Government, Business and the Law, 
5 ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L.J. 561, 574-75 (2010), for discussion of the “dual roles” of the 
Treasury Department as both shareholder and steward of the U.S. financial system. These weighty 
questions have, as in the Amtrak case, been the subject of recent federal litigation. See, e.g., Starr 
Int’l Co., Inc. v. United States, 121 Fed. Cl. 428, 430 (2015), aff ’d in part, vacated in part, 856 F.3d 953 
(Fed. Cir. 2017) (finding improper the federal government’s 2008 acquisition of 79.9% equity 
ownership in AIG, but awarding zero damages). 
26 For discussion of these competing pressures and interests, see generally Jon Entine, The 
Politicization of Public Investments, in PENSION FUND POLITICS: THE DANGERS OF SOCIALLY 
RESPONSIBLE INVESTING 1 (Jon Entine ed., 2014). 
27 See Shinar, supra note 5; Kim, supra note 5; see also Randy J. Kozel, Reconceptualizing Public 
Employee Speech, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 1007, 1010 (2005). Here too we have considerable case law. See, 
e.g., Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 426 (2006). 
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Government Compliance with Industrial Regulations. Many federal laws and 
administrative rules specifically regulate the behavior of private businesses 
engaged in interstate commerce.28 What then happens when government 
agencies or government corporations participate in the market? Should those 
government units voluntarily abide by the laws and rules regulating private 
businesses? Or should they instead take advantage of the fact that they are, 
perhaps uniquely, under no explicit legal obligation to comply? 
Government as Proprietor. More than a dozen states run their own retail 
liquor stores. Should a particular state, hostile, say, to President Trump’s 
political agenda, be able to stop selling Trump Wine—just as Nordstrom 
discontinued the sale of Ivanka Trump’s line of clothing? Or would such a 
decision constitute a form of unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination? 
Government as Wage Setter. The U.S. Postal Service, another well-known 
government corporation, has historically paid its workers more than the going 
market rate for drivers, clerks, and couriers. Should the Postal Service continue 
to pay above-market wages and benefits to its employees—consistent, no 
doubt, with some welfarist commitment to socioeconomic empowerment of 
the lower-middle class?29 Or should it equalize its pay to that offered by the 
likes of FedEx and UPS? 
II. THE SOVEREIGN–COMMERCIAL CONFLICT INHERENT IN 
GOVERNMENT MARKET PARTICIPATION 
As the above-stylized sketches reveal, the government market 
participation terrain is a fraught one—a veritable minefield of constitutional 
and statutory law concerns, normative questions surrounding appropriate 
pricing and valuation, economic questions of market competition and failure, 
and architectural questions of corporate and bureaucratic institutional design. 
The sketches further reveal a simultaneously socialistic and entrepreneurial 
government acting opportunistically, out of some real or perceived necessity, 
in response to some regulatory lapse or shortcoming, or as a result of some 
path-dependent accident of history. Though the examples are neither especially 
exhaustive nor particularly nuanced, they nevertheless capture a range of 
practices and rationales. They also illuminate a common set of problems. 
 
28 See, e.g., Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, Pub. L. 91-596 § 3(5), 84 Stat. 1590, 
1591 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 652) (exempting all governmental entities, save the Postal Service, from 
the definition of an “employer” under the landmark workplace safety statute). 
29 See Jon D. Michaels, Privatization’s Progeny, 101 GEO. L.J. 1023, 1068-69 (2013). See generally 
Thomas Meehan, Moynihan of the Moynihan Report, N.Y. TIMES (July 31, 1966), https://
www.nytimes.com/books/98/10/04/specials/moynihan-report.html [https://perma.cc/N2J4-Q6G3] 
(describing mid-twentieth-century postal employment as, by design, a gateway to the middle class). 
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In essence, the challenge of government market participation may be 
distilled down to this: how do government officials go about fulfilling, 
accommodating, or subordinating their liberal, democratic, and sovereign 
responsibilities in intrinsically or conceivably commercial contexts? Ought 
they act the part of rational economic actor—and seek the commercially best 
arrangement possible? Ought they be primarily interested in promoting 
overall public aims—assuming those aims are readily discernible—even if doing 
so comes at the expense of the commercially prized goals of high revenues or 
cost savings? Or should they endeavor to reconcile the two governing 
orientations—adopting some murky middle ground?30 
One may consider the challenges of government market participation 
from any number of vantage points. To date, many interventions have been 
narrow, addressed to specific subgroups of government market participants 
or particular issues relevant primarily to discrete pockets of government 
market participation. For example, some scholars and jurists have zeroed in 
on government market participation as it relates to the Dormant Commerce 
Clause, the First Amendment, or the Equal Protection Clause. Others, in 
turn, have examined institutions such as the Postal Service or the Tennessee 
Valley Authority.31 
This Article, by contrast, addresses government market participation in a 
transsubstantive fashion. Recognizing that sovereign–commercial conflicts 
exist to some degree in most instances of government market participation, I 
argue that such conflicts are qualitatively different from those we confront in 
the ordinary course of lawmaking, rulemaking, or corporate decisionmaking. 
I further contend that the sovereign–commercial conflicts are more like the 
conflicts that our constitutional system anticipates and seeks to regulate 
through various forms of structural separation. 
This Part does the work of distinguishing the sovereign–commercial 
conflict from ordinary sovereign–sovereign and commercial–commercial 
conflicts that government and business officials regularly confront. First, I 
define what I mean by commercial and sovereign responsibilities. Second, I 
show how the sovereign–commercial conflicts do indeed differ from most 
routine government and corporate conflicts. Third, I identify the special 
challenges and problems that sovereign–commercial conflicts engender. These 
 
30 To be clear, sometimes the choice is made for government market participants. Congress or 
a state legislature can and does steer government market participants, directing them to act more or 
less commercially. But, for reasons explained below, democratic accountability and legislative 
specificity do not necessarily resolve the fundamental problem of government market participants 
navigating sovereign and commercial waters using both sovereign and commercial tools (and 
toggling between sovereign and commercial legal identities). See infra notes 113–115 and 
accompanying text. 
31 See supra note 5. 
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conflicts render government potentially too weak, too corrupt, or too powerful 
and threatening. Fourth, I provide an international comparison and suggest 
that, ironically enough, the U.S. government is quite attuned to—and alarmed 
by—other nations’ sovereign–commercial conflicts. 
A. Distinguishing Sovereign from Commercial: Terms and Definition 
This Article employs the term “commercial” colloquially. Commercial tools 
are the ones we generally associate with the everyday buying, trading, selling, 
or leasing of goods or services. Commercial tasks are ones that businesses, 
firms, and other economic actors undertake in the regular course of events. 
And commercial objectives are the goals ascribed to said rational economic 
actors. This is all relatively straightforward in unambiguously commercial 
settings—though we of course make allowances for even the most hardheaded 
of businesses to, on occasion, act against economic self-interest. 
I likewise use the term “sovereign” colloquially, capaciously, and in a 
purposely stylized manner. In doing so, I hope to strip the term of the 
normative and definitional baggage that notions and characterizations of 
sovereignty typically carry with them. Sovereign tools are those we associate with 
the State’s coercive powers to regulate, adjudicate, punish, and tax. Sovereign 
responsibilities are those viewed as necessary or important for the benefit and 
security of the nation and its people. We can and do disagree about how we 
should best promote the national welfare. And, in a similar vein, we can and do 
disagree about how far sovereign responsibilities extend. For present purposes, 
I’m indifferent as to the scope and content of those responsibilities and simply 
stipulate that sovereign responsibilities are those understood to advance some 
set of constitutionally authorized and democratically agreed upon ends. 
Clearly, a pure commercial orientation may clash with sovereign 
interests—and vice versa. For example, U.S. government scientists develop 
patentable technologies with some regularity.32 Should the feds license the IP 
rights to the highest bidder, as any purely commercial concern would? Ought 
they take a quasi-protectionist turn and thus limit bidding to a small group 
of national champions? Or ought they put those discoveries in the public 
domain, as a sovereign committed to disseminating information and 
encouraging scientific progress might (and sometimes does)?33 
By that token, assuming comparable quality, should government officials 
procure some goods from the seller who offers the lowest price; from the 
 
32 NASA has an entire Technology Transfer Program. See Technology Transfer Program, NASA, 
http://technology.nasa.gov/patents [https://perma.cc/7KVY-FSY5]. 
33 See Brian Fung, NASA Is Opening Up Hundreds of Patents to Inventors, for Free, WASH. POST 
(Oct. 7, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2015/10/07/nasa-is-opening-
up-hundreds-of-patents-to-inventors-for-free/ [https://perma.cc/AYP3-PRBL]. 
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cheapest American (or in-state) seller; or from the cheapest domestic vendor 
who happens to run a minority-owned small business?34 Moreover, ought our 
answer differ if we are buying drones rather than desk lamps? 
Lastly, even assuming we all agree that Amtrak is in the “business” of 
commercial service delivery, we may still query whether the government 
should subsidize passenger rail service for, say, students, seniors, and the 
poor—if not for everyone. And we may ponder further what services Amtrak 
qua business should offer. Assuming that there is no public-regarding case to 
be made for underwriting luxury train travel in Acela’s sumptuous First Class, 
we may nevertheless wonder whether it is proper for the government to create 
or reify class divides in the transportation sector, even if those willing and 
able to pay top dollar for Acela’s First Class help subsidize everyone else’s 
coach fare.35 
B. Analogous Conflicts and Incompatibilities 
Given government’s extensive role in the modern political economy, the 
existence of sovereign–commercial conflicts, big and small, are practically 
inescapable. But that doesn’t necessarily mean we have a problem—let alone a 
problem distinct from the ordinary challenges of governing. Government 
officials are invariably forced to choose among competing priorities. They are 
instructed to, say, uphold public safety, regulate the market for food and drugs, 
guard against forest fires, alleviate highway congestion, and provide for the 
national defense. None of these tasks is particularly easy or even straightforward. 
First, government officials recognize that resources are scarce. They 
cannot—and do not—expect to chase every bad guy or prevent every forest 
fire. Second, government officials must be sensitive to claims that they are 
overzealous. Were they to go after every scofflaw (including, say, jaywalkers) 
or stomp out every potential forest fire (including, say, a well-contained and 
vigilantly monitored Scout campfire), they would quickly lose public 
support.36 Third, government officials understand that there are competing 
approaches and strategies for how best to accomplish their given tasks. For 
instance, a transportation chief instructed to ease congestion must decide 
whether to build an additional road, widen the existing roads, add new bus 
lines, or expand subway services. And even once she decides, say, to build a 
 
34 See, e.g., U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN., OFF. OF GOV’T CONTRACTING & BUS. DEV., 
VETERAN OWNED SMALL BUSINESS CONTRACTING PROGRAMS 3-4 (June 2013); see also Jerry 
Mashaw, The Fear of Discretion in Government Procurement, 8 YALE J. REG. 511, 514 (1991). 
35 See MICHAEL J. SANDEL, WHAT MONEY CAN’T BUY: THE MORAL LIMITS OF MARKETS 
10 (2012). 
36 For historical discussions of public backlash against overzealous agency enforcement and 
prosecution, see NICHOLAS R. PARRILLO, AGAINST THE PROFIT MOTIVE: THE SALARY 
REVOLUTION IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT, 1780–1940 195-208 (2013). 
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new road, she still might have to choose between doing so in a way that paves 
over on a popular suburban park or that bisects a struggling inner-city 
neighborhood. A forest ranger, for her part, must decide how to allocate 
resources among programs that educate the public about the dangers of forest 
fires, that recruit more firefighters, and that preemptively irrigate the driest 
woodland. Lastly, the President must decide whether a peace agreement, 
economic sanctions, saber rattling, or war (and, if so, what kind of war) is 
most likely to bolster our national defense. 
The balancing of competing interests and strategies is hardly exceptional. 
It is precisely what republican governments are designed to do. As James 
Madison understood, the republican form of government serves “to refine and 
enlarge the public views by passing them through the medium of a chosen body 
of citizens, whose wisdom may best discern the true interest of their country.”37 
I have been characterizing such conflicts as ordinary sovereign–sovereign 
conflicts—ones we expect legislators and agency personnel to resolve. Some 
public officials are especially attentive to costs and revenue returns.38 But 
rarely are those officials so attentive that cost savings and revenue raising 
become ends unto themselves—a case of the tail wagging the dog. 
That’s why there has been, of late, outrage over a federal student loan 
program that reportedly results in an annual government windfall north of 
$100 billion at a time when higher education is exceedingly expensive, the job 
market for college graduates remains uneven, and record numbers are 
struggling mightily to meet their loan payments.39 And that’s also why there 
is rising opposition to law enforcement agencies’ use of their civil forfeiture 
power. As suggested above, critics allege that police departments’ preference 
for civil forfeiture—over the traditional practice of arrest, prosecution, and 
incarceration—is financially motivated, what some call “Policing for Profit.”40 
In effect, governments secure large payments from those accused of 
wrongdoing without incurring any of the upfront costs or uncertainty 
associated with criminal prosecutions, let alone the back-end costs of 
incarcerating those successfully prosecuted.41 
 
37 THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 82 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
38 See OSBORNE & GAEBLER, supra note 10, at 195-218. 
39 See Letter from Senators to Sec’y Duncan, Dep’t of Educ. (Feb. 25, 2015), http://www.warren.
senate.gov/files/documents/2015_25_02_Letter_to_Secretary_Duncan_re_Student_Loan_Profits.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/6MB3-5MV7] (objecting to the Department of Education’s seeming preference 
for generating revenue from student loans over alleviating the burdens placed on unemployed and 
underemployed recent graduates). 
40 DICK M. CARPENTER II ET AL., POLICING FOR PROFIT: THE ABUSE OF CIVIL ASSET 
FORFEITURE, INSTITUTE FOR JUSTICE (2d ed. 2015), http://ij.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/
policing-for-profit-2nd-edition.pdf [https://perma.cc/AS6U-Z3VX]. 
41 See Sarah Stillman, Taken, NEW YORKER, (Aug. 12-19 2013), http://www.newyorker.com/
magazine/2013/08/12/taken [https://perma.cc/SUB2-VKW9]; see also George F. Will, When 
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This is what makes government market participation different. 
Government officials may prioritize—or be compelled to prioritize—one of 
two often irreconcilable objectives. The dog may wag the tail or, as just 
mentioned, the tail may wag the dog. 
Of similar consequence, government market participants enjoy a bigger 
toolkit. Ordinary government officials possess sovereign (that is, legal and 
coercive) tools. Businesses, for their part, possess only commercial (that is, 
financial and transactional) tools, even when confronting the most vexing of 
commercial–commercial conflicts. 
Given this expanded toolkit, there is no close analogy between a 
government market participant and a federal, state, or municipal 
transportation secretary tasked with easing congestion within budgetary 
limits. Nor is there a close analogy between a government market participant 
and a corporate executive deciding whether to relocate plants overseas. 
Instead, the nearer comparison is to an owner–operator of an old-time 
company town. This proprietor both runs a business and effectively governs 
the surrounding community.42 
Possessing the dual toolkit of a sovereign and a business changes 
everything. Consider Congress’s plan for Amtrak to act as government 
regulator and for-profit corporation. By giving Amtrak these dual powers, 
Congress enabled the government railroad to summon the coercive force of 
its federal rulemaking power to tilt the commercial landscape in its favor. By 
contrast, entirely commercial firms competing with Amtrak had to make do 
with market levers (and only market levers) in their quest to increase, or even 
maintain, profitability and market share. To be sure, those private firms enjoy 
additional means of influence. Among other things, they could lobby 
government decisionmakers. But license to lobby, to petition Congress, and 
to support candidates are not sovereign powers. They are, instead, decidedly 
private powers entrusted to all of us—and done so for the purpose of 
empowering civil society and corporate interests to influence and possibly 
check the exercise of sovereign authority. And, for better or worse, those 
private powers are commercially inflected insofar as financial clout correlates 
strongly with political influence. 
 
Government Is the Looter, WASH. POST, (May 18, 2012), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/
when-government-is-the-looter/2012/05/18/gIQAUIKVZU_story.html [https://perma.cc/W58K-
FSML] (criticizing “law enforcement agencies [for] padding their budgets and financing 
boondoggles” through civil forfeiture). 
42 See, e.g., Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 506 (1946) (describing a company-owned town 
and assessing its governance responsibilities). Firms such as Facebook and Google that regulate 
sizable virtual communities and effectively make policy while running for-profit businesses may be 
viewed by some as latter-day manifestations of the old company towns. See Chander, supra note 6, 
at 1808; cf. Frank Pasquale, Beyond Innovation and Competition: The Need for Qualified Transparency 
in Internet Intermediaries, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 105, 105, 111-12 (2010). 
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We see the converse resolution of the sovereign–commercial conflict when 
we turn to the federal government and the bailouts of 2008 and 2009. 
Specifically, the Treasury Department employed its commercial powers as 
principal owner of bailed-out companies such as General Motors (GM) to 
advance several sovereign aims, including cleaner air, greater energy 
conservation, and lower unemployment.43 This particular set of 
commercialized sovereign interventions shows how government market 
participants are specially—and powerfully—situated: If Treasury desires to 
regulate GM above and beyond the terms of the bailout itself, its position as 
an owner allows for the circumvention of the difficult and democratically 
contested legislative and rulemaking processes. Absent commercial powers, 
Treasury—like any other government unit that lacks a complementary arsenal 
of commercial tools—would be forced to go to Congress or, alternatively, 
issue a notice of proposed rulemaking (and begin that involved process). 
Thus here too we see an actor straddling two worlds. Above, I just 
compared government market participants with proprietors of company 
towns. Yet one strains to find especially close public sector comparisons. A 
government market participant who straddles the two worlds does so, perhaps, 
like a prosecutor who also has the power to preside over criminal trials, or like 
a Secretary of State who serves concurrently as a United States Senator. 
Those comparisons are, I think, apt because just like the government 
market participant, neither of those hypothetical government officials can 
readily reconcile her dual status or dual institutional responsibilities. An 
official who acts both as prosecutor and judge brings charges and then tries 
defendants brought up on those very charges. And an official who serves as 
both Secretary of State and U.S. Senator negotiates and signs treaties and 
then, soon after, votes to ratify those very agreements. In both instances, 
institutional roles—as prosecutor, diplomat, judge, or legislator—are at least 
partially compromised, if not altogether subverted. We understand these 
two-hat-wearing officials as prima facie problematic and presumptively 
abusive. Thus, we need not consider the objective merits of the prosecutor’s 
case or the soundness of the diplomat’s treaty before crying foul. 
Again, the ordinary sovereign–sovereign conflicts discussed above are the 
very bread and butter of republican government. But dual-role conflicts of 
the sort just posited seem entirely unfamiliar—and unacceptable. One reason 
they seem so is because these dual roles are constitutionally prohibited. One 
person’s service as both prosecutor and judge is inconsistent with our 
conception of due process.44 And, even more straightforward, the 
 
43 See Black, supra note 25, at 589-90. 
44 Cf. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 453 (1971) (finding no constitutional support 
for the issuance of a warrant by a “state official who was [also] the chief investigator and prosecutor 
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Constitution’s Incompatibility Clause plainly prohibits members of Congress 
from moonlighting in the President’s Cabinet.45 It is telling that government 
market participants share much in common with these hypothetical dual 
officeholders: all of them are in a position to leverage two discrete sets of tools 
and toggle between two sets of identities. 
Surely, one may argue that I’m drawing unfair comparisons—associating 
heretofore legally unobjectionable government market participation with 
practices long understood to be constitutionally verboten. But that argument 
may prove too much. After all, the concerns we so quickly and effortlessly 
identify with dual prosecutors/judges and dual Cabinet Secretaries/Senators 
reflect our—that is, the United States’s—broad constitutional commitments 
to the separations of powers, including, often, the separation of institutions, 
instruments, and personnel. To be clear, the assignment of dual, conflicting 
responsibilities in government personnel is not invariably improper. After all, 
we encounter any number of inquisitorial systems of government where the 
existence of a dual prosecutor–adjudicator is far less troublesome. And many 
perfectly reputable parliamentary systems provide for sitting legislators to 
lead important government ministries. Our discomfort with these dual roles 
is therefore very much a function of the United States’s especially strident 
embrace of separating and checking State power. And just as we separate 
federal–state and executive–legislative–judicial roles—not to mention 
civilian–military, church–State, and public–private roles—there is a 
constitutional case to be made (again, at least in the United States) for 
likewise separating the sovereign and the commercial. 
C.  The Architecture of the Sovereign–Commercial Conflict 
We can push these analogies further still: the concerns surrounding the 
fusion of sovereign and commercial responsibilities track those that justify 
the various other lines of separation central to our constitutional system. 
Indeed, we regularly think of the separations of powers as advancing three 
primary aims: to align government departments’ institutional features with 
their organizational missions and orientations; to avoid the appearance and 
prevent the reality of public self-dealing; and, of course, to safeguard 
individual liberty. As it happens, separating the sovereign from the 
commercial seemingly advances those very same aims. 
 
in the case”). The Supreme Court has also prohibited executive officials (otherwise unrelated to the 
arrest or prosecution) serving in judicial capacities, at least insofar as any fines assessed in criminal 
judicial proceedings can be drawn upon by said executive in furtherance of carrying out their 
executive duties. Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57, 60 (1972). 
45 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 2. 
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1. Separation and Institutional Mismatch 
Government market participation tends to be funneled through one of 
two sets of institutions. There are the familiar public administrative agencies, 
permitted, directed, or obligated to engage in some form of commerce. Any 
such commercial engagement reinforces, is added to, is conjoined with, or 
comes at the expense of their regular sovereign duties. And any such 
commercial engagement broadens, deepens, or complicates those agencies’ 
governing perspective or orientation. 
There are, also, government corporations of a bewildering number of stripes 
and complexions. These entities often have an internal architecture—and 
institutional orientation—more in keeping with what we find in business 
settings than in the agencies ringing the National Mall. These government 
corporations may in turn be encouraged or obligated to consider sovereign 
aims or commitments, as add-ons to or in conjunction with their sundry 
commercial responsibilities.46 
As an institutional matter, neither government agencies nor government 
corporations are likely to be particularly adept at advancing both sovereign 
and commercial aims. By and large, agencies are constructed to carry out the 
State’s sovereign, democratic interests. And government corporations, in 
turn, are generally designed to further the State’s commercial interests. 
Indeed, often government corporations are intended to be anti-agencies of a 
sort, with Congress viewing agencies as poor instruments of State commerce 
and enterprise. 
Let me explain. Government agencies, such as the Department of Labor 
or the Department of Transportation, are pluralistic, internally divided, and 
internally rivalrous. The intra-agency divisions and rivalries constitute what 
I elsewhere call the administrative separation of powers.47 They give meaning 
and effect to important, if not always appreciated, tensions among the agency 
leaders (appointed by the President); the politically insulated, career civil 
servants; and the public writ large, authorized to participate broadly and 
meaningfully in many facets of administrative governance. 
This tripartite fragmentation of agency power serves as a constitutional 
salve, helping to redeem the Framers’ constitutional commitment to the 
separation of powers in an era of modern administrative governance. (Recall 
that this constitutional commitment was profoundly tested by the decision of 
twentieth-century lawmakers to delegate previously disaggregated legislative, 
 
46 Cf. Anne Joseph O’Connell, Bureaucracy at the Boundary, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 841, 857-61 
(2014); DAVID E. LEWIS & JENNIFER L. SELIN, ADMIN. CONF. OF THE U.S., SOURCEBOOK OF 
UNITED STATES EXECUTIVE AGENCIES 60-64 (2012), https://permanent.access.gpo.gov/
gpo37402/Sourcebook-2012-Final_12-Dec_Online.pdf [https://perma.cc/TM6V-H5LP]. 
47 See Michaels, Enduring, Evolving, supra note 14, at 530. 
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executive, and judicial powers to initially unitary administrative agencies.48) 
Again, I present these arguments in more robust forms elsewhere.49 For our 
immediate purposes, it is enough to recognize that a collaborative, 
contentious, and pluralistic framework for intra-agency rivalry and separation 
exists; that these rivalries ensure that administrative action is the product of 
extensive input (and ultimately buy-in); and that agencies, precisely because of 
this administrative separation of powers, are suitable and legitimate shapers, 
enforcers, and arbiters of sovereign interests in our constitutional republic.50 
Yet when it comes to government market participation, this intentionally 
fragmented organizational structure (so necessary for constitutionally sound 
democratic decisionmaking) seems clunky. Leading accounts of American 
corporate governance understand homogeneous organizational control to be 
the institutional arrangement best suited to advance the singular 
commercial objective of profit maximization.51 Specifically, homogeneous 
control allows entities to be fast and decisive, and the corresponding absence 
of internal fragmentation and rivalries narrows the space for dissent and 
obstruction of the kind that may disadvantage government agencies vis-à-vis 
their commercial competitors.52 
Government corporations, to some extent modeled on private 
corporations, tend to be viewed as having an advantageous design choice 
precisely because they are not internally fragmented like agencies.53 Among 
other things, government corporations generally lack an independent, 
politically insulated civil service; they may instead be free to employ at-will 
workers, as do most private commercial concerns.54 Government corporations 
 
48 See id. at 526. 
49 See id.; see also MICHAELS, CONSTITUTIONAL COUP, supra note 11, at 57-70. 
50 See Jon D. Michaels, Of Constitutional Custodians and Regulatory Rivals: An Account of the Old 
and New Separation of Powers, 91 N.Y.U. L. REV. 227, 265 (2016). 
51 See generally HENRY HANSMANN, THE OWNERSHIP OF ENTERPRISE 39-44 (1996); 
Michael C. Jensen, Value Maximization, Stakeholder Theory and the Corporate Objective Function, 12 
BUS. ETHICS Q. 235, 249 (2002); Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for 
Corporate Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 439, 440-41 (2001). 
52 Cf. Jerry L. Mashaw, Reinventing Government and Regulatory Reform: Studies in the Neglect and 
Abuse of Administrative Law, 57 U. PITT. L. REV. 405, 412-13 (1996) (recognizing that commercial 
outfits focus on questions of management, whereas public instrumentalities are concerned with 
governance strategies). 
53 See KEVIN R. KOSAR, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL30365, FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 
CORPORATIONS: AN OVERVIEW 10 (June 8, 2011). For discussions of the difference between 
agencies and corporations when it comes to matters of public input, rivalrous decisionmaking, and other 
process and design questions, see MICHAELS, CONSTITUTIONAL COUP, supra note 11, at 163-66. 
54 See generally Katherine V.W. Stone, Revisiting the At-Will Employment Doctrine, 36 INDUS. 
L.J. 84 (2007). 
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also tend to be less transparent and less open to public participation of the 
sort we have come to expect from agencies.55 
We are, or at least we should be, comfortable with fragmented, 
contentious government decisionmaking—notwithstanding that such 
fragmented contentiousness is so time- and resource-intensive—precisely 
because we have an enduring constitutional commitment to a pluralistic, 
rivalrous model of sovereign government. Fragmented, rivalrous government 
is, in short, a feature, not a bug, of a liberal republic founded upon the 
separating and checking of State power. (This is, in essence, what the 
businesslike government crowd fails to appreciate. Of course, we can 
aggressively streamline administrative rulemaking and other sovereign 
tasks—but at what cost to our constitutional commitments?56) 
And we are, and are told that we should be, comfortable with 
homogeneous organization control over businesses, at least so long as we 
expect—and indeed demand—businesses to be unflinchingly profit-seeking. 
Note that this division between sovereign and commercial entities, works—and 
works well—only if everyone recognizes that the State needs the authority 
and resources to support and protect capitalism’s casualties.57  
By these reckonings, vesting both sovereign and commercial responsibilities 
in either administrative agencies or government corporations invites 
misalignment—a mismatch between organizational architecture and 
programmatic orientation. Agencies cannot be expected to handle commercial 
duties particularly well. And, when it comes to government corporations and 
sovereign powers, we run the risk of decisions being made without the 
requisite democratic input, rivalrous engagement, and overall procedural 
rigor. Indeed, we routinely snicker at how agencies fumble about as they try 
to purchase new staplers,58 and we may shudder at how government 
 
55 See A. Michael Froomkin, Reinventing the Government Corporation, 1995 U. ILL. L. REV. 543, 
560 (1995) (describing lax regulation and oversight of government corporations compared to 
administrative agencies); KOSAR, supra note 53, at 8 (noting that Congress gives government 
corporations “marginal attention” and that these bodies “come under comparatively little 
congressional scrutiny”). 
56 MICHAELS, CONSTITUTIONAL COUP, supra note 11, at 165-66. 
57 See, e.g., JACOB S. HACKER & PAUL PIERSON, AMERICAN AMNESIA: HOW THE WAR ON 
GOVERNMENT LED US TO FORGET WHAT MADE AMERICA PROSPER (2016) (describing the 
broad mid-twentieth-century consensus in favor of a welfare state complete with a strong and 
expansive social safety net). If and when that recognition falters, we might have reason to challenge 
the governing corporate orthodoxy and make different and broader demands of businesses. Indeed, 
perhaps the State’s failure to provide for capitalism’s casualties is in part what animates those who 
challenge the primacy of shareholder value theory in corporate governance. 
58 Cf. James Taranto, The Ashtray of History: Remember “Reinventing Government?” No, and with 
Good Reason, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 6, 2011), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1000142405297020490380
4577082550219655404 [https://perma.cc/99XB-SG5D] (describing some of the more showy ways in 
which Al Gore highlighted government procurement waste and cost overruns). 
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corporations make welfarist determinations expediently and unilaterally, 
without meaningful public involvement. 
Note that the mismatch concerns may seem relatively small bore. But 
make no mistake: it is of great relevance if for no other reason than because 
we evaluate government commercial engagement in terms of efficiency and 
productivity.59 Moreover, we assess government sovereign engagement based 
in considerable part on how robust, inclusive, and deliberative the 
administrative process was.60 The mismatch concerns are still more relevant 
because questions of efficient institutional alignment are, as I describe later, 
themselves constitutionally salient. 
2. Separation and Public Self-Dealing 
Worse than simply engendering institutional mismatches wherein the 
architecture of government entities does not jibe with the sovereign or 
commercial orientation of those entities, sovereign–commercial conflicts 
might lead to the abdication, subordination, or outright denial of sovereign 
duties and obligations. A government unit that, by choice or directive, gives 
primacy to commercial considerations may end up diminishing the State and 
undermining its moral authority. 
Consider a pair of the case studies introduced in Part I. First, there is 
government as employer. Senior government officials may contend that they 
are acting in a commercial, proprietary capacity when they make personnel 
decisions—that is, hiring, firing, promotions, and demotions—managing a 
workforce just as a private entity would. This classification (as commercial) 
 
59 Congress, the President, and the media often make considerable hay out of the profitability, 
or lack thereof, of government enterprises such as Amtrak and the Postal Service. See, e.g., Ron 
Nixon, Amtrak Losing Millions Each Year on Food Sales, Audit Finds, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 2, 2012), http://
www.nytimes.com/2012/08/03/us/politics/amtrak-lost-834-million-on-food-in-last-decade-audit-
finds.html [https://perma.cc/QDB9-BCPH]; Robert J. Samuelson, The Expensive Amtrak Fantasy, 
WASH. POST (Mar. 5. 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/robert-samuelson-the-expensive-
amtrak-fantasy/2013/03/05/4224bfe6-85de-11e2-9d71-f0feafdd1394_story.html [https://perma.cc/R93H-
AU4B]; U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-09-475T, U.S. POSTAL SERVICE: 
ESCALATING FINANCIAL PROBLEMS REQUIRE MAJOR COST REDUCTIONS TO LIMIT LOSSES 
(2009); see also Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Dec. 29, 2017, 5:04 AM), 
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/946728546633953285 [https://perma.cc/QL5A-MDYA] 
(calling into question the delivery prices set by the U.S. Postal Service, “which is losing many 
billions of dollars a year”). 
60 See Mashaw, supra note 52, at 406, 412-13; Michaels, Of Constitutional Custodians, supra note 50, 
at 273 (“Courts can increase or decrease the deference accorded to agency actions or interpretations 
depending on the degree to which those actions or interpretations were arrived at through a truly 
rivalrous, heterogeneous, and inclusive administrative process.”); see also Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., 
“History Belongs to the Winners”: The Bazelon–Leventhal Debate and the Continuing Relevance of the 
Process/Substance Dichotomy in Judicial Review of Agency Action, 58 ADMIN. L. REV. 995, 999-1002 (2006) 
(describing a pivotal judicial battle over whether to scrutinize agency outcomes or agency processes). 
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matters because senior officials may wish, when sanctioning employees, to act 
outside the scope of the First Amendment, and thus fire or demote employees 
for, among other things, otherwise protected speech acts.61 Disavowing their 
sovereign status—and thus shedding any corresponding constitutional 
duties—may well make government more adroit and flexible, not to mention 
commercially competitive. But the price of such dexterity is dear indeed. For 
example, license to avoid certain constitutional responsibilities that otherwise 
attach to sovereign–citizen relations may well undermine the case for 
granting the government coercive powers in the first place. We do so, after 
all, fully expecting that the government will subject itself to any number of 
constitutional restrictions including those articulated in the First, Fourth, 
Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments.62 And we do so, I would add, expecting 
that the government remains internally rivalrous and pluralistic. Allowing 
high-ranking officials to fire or demote subordinates for unpopular or critical 
speech may subvert the administrative separation of powers—specifically by 
weakening the nonpartisan bureaucracy’s ability to challenge and oppose 
presidentially appointed agency leaders. 
Second, consider Amtrak. Congress designated Amtrak as a for-profit 
government entity,63 and the D.C. Circuit suggested that, as a result of that 
designation, Amtrak’s corporate officers might have fiduciary duties to 
maximize profits.64 Amtrak officials certainly face political pressure to 
operate in the black. Congress is, after all, a regular and fierce critic of 
Amtrak’s fiscal management.65 
Along with its commercial obligations, Amtrak recently possessed 
regulatory responsibilities. Specifically, Congress gave Amtrak a leading role 
in devising rules affecting the railroad industry. Rules favoring Amtrak’s 
particular interests would no doubt help the passenger rail keep its costs down 
and its customer satisfaction high. And this is precisely the problem. Recent 
suits challenged Amtrak’s dual—and conflicting—status as a federal rulemaker 
and commercial profit-seeker, underscoring the tension between regulating in 
 
61 See Kim, supra note 5; Shinar, supra note 5. 
62 Cf. Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 588-89 (1972) (Marshall, J., dissenting) 
(emphasizing the government’s heightened duty of reasonableness and fairness in practically all of 
its transactions and interventions); Michaels, Running Government Like a Business, supra note 1, at 
1159 (stressing the correspondence between the State’s vast powers and its responsibility “to exercise 
[those] powers . . . fairly, democratically, and constitutionally”). 
63 Ass’n of Am. R.Rs. v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp., 721 F.3d 666, 674-75 (D.C. Cir. 2013), rev’d on 
other grounds sub nom. 135 S. Ct. 1225 (2015). 
64 721 F.3d at 676. 
65 One recent full committee hearing concentrated on the “mismanagement of the issues 
relating to food services and beverages at Amtrak.” A Review of Amtrak Operations, Part I: 
Mismanagement of Food & Beverage Services: Hearing Before the Comm. on Transportation and 
Infrastructure, 112th Cong. 1 (2012) (statement of Congressman John L. Mica). 
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a self-serving fashion and doing what is in the public interest. The D.C. Circuit 
found Amtrak’s dual status to be unconstitutional, specifically because of the 
high risk of self-dealing.66 At bottom, the court’s stated concerns are consonant 
with those expressed in this Article: Amtrak may well choose or feel compelled 
to misuse its sovereign, coercive tools to boost its commercial standing. 
To be sure, even the appearance of impropriety—that is, the possibility that 
the government’s commercial objectives influence regulatory outcomes—has 
serious ramifications. Government entities perceived as using their sovereign 
powers to boost their commercial output are likely to engender distrust 
and intensify existing doubts. Again, we need look no further than the 
rather forceful opposition amassing against municipalities for their ready 
reliance on civil forfeitures—as an alternative to criminal justice—to 
gauge public distrust of government agencies that raise money through 
seemingly self-serving regulation.67 
Note this is not only a concern with businesslike government. We might 
have a similar reaction were government officials to take on—or refuse to 
shed—ecclesiastical duties and harness their State powers and State platforms 
in furtherance of their religious commitments. Consider, for example, a 
scenario in which the Archbishop of New York was elected Governor of New 
York (and retained his leadership position in the Catholic Church). As a 
Cardinal–Governor he would invariably find himself between a proverbial 
rock and hard place, torn between the dictates of canon and constitutional 
law. Nevertheless, he would be bound by the strong anti-Erastian 
commitment reflected in the Establishment Clause. As Sam Rascoff recounts, 
the Framers “were deeply concerned with attempts by the state to harness the 
power of religion to achieve ‘secular’ political goals.”68 Particularly sensitive 
to the power-accreting effects of fusing State and church powers, Rascoff 
reminds us further that the Framers “conceived of the Establishment Clause 
as a bulwark against precisely this sort of aggrandizement of the state.”69 
This hypothetical is, I hasten to add, different from actual scenarios 
involving officials such as Kentucky’s Kim Davis. Davis, a county clerk of 
fleeting notoriety—her fifteen minutes came in 2015—insisted her personal 
 
66 Ass’n of Am. R.Rs., 821 F.3d at 23; see also Alexander Volokh, The New Private-Regulation 
Skepticism: Due Process, Non-Delegation, and Antitrust Challenges, 37 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 931, 
980 (2014) (framing the Amtrak case as a due process case, an approach that the D.C. Circuit later 
adopted). 
67 See, e.g., MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW 79-83 (2010) (characterizing civil 
forfeiture as a “shakedown” with minimal due process protections); supra notes 40–41 and 
accompanying text. 
68 Samuel J. Rascoff, Establishing Official Islam? The Law and Strategy of Counter-Radicalization, 
64 STAN. L. REV. 125, 133 (2012). 
69 Id. 
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religious convictions prevented her from carrying out her public duties.70 
Specifically, she refused to issue marriage licenses to same-sex couples, in 
contravention of the Supreme Court’s Obergefell v. Hodges decision.71 That 
real-world example, however, is more akin to cases of private corruption: 
Davis was accruing personal, albeit spiritual, benefits rather than satisfying 
alternative and incommensurate professional obligations. Thus Davis, a 
government clerk who held no other office, is not like the Senator–diplomat 
or prosecutor–judge (or Cardinal–Governor). Instead, she is like the crooked 
public official who subverts her public charge for some private, though not 
necessarily pecuniary, gain. 
These sovereign–commercial situations are not likely to arise regularly, 
hence the rather farfetched hypothetical involving a Cardinal–Governor. 
What’s more, it may well be the case that trust in government, already 
woefully low, will not (and perhaps cannot) plummet further simply because 
some government entity appears to disavow its sovereign obligations or misuse 
its sovereign powers. To be sure, we can just as easily downplay the concerns 
associated with prosecutor–judges and Senator–diplomats. Dual-role 
assignments were unlikely to arise with any regularity. Even so, it was 
speculative at best that dual-role officials would do any measurable harm.72 
And, assuming the worst, it still isn’t clear that conflicted dual-role officials 
would trouble voters, let alone shatter faith in government. Yet the separation 
of those responsibilities is nonetheless vigilantly enforced, in part because 
even the occasional fusion of otherwise disaggregated sovereign duties is 
unacceptable, particularly in our system predicated on comprehensively 
rivalrous government; and in part because government distrust runs deep in 
our political and legal culture (such that we cannot afford to risk squandering 
what little political and cultural capital government retains). 
3. Separation and Abusive Government 
I just described the possibility of government officials resolving 
sovereign–commercial conflicts in favor of commercial interests. Needless to 
say, the resolution of sovereign–commercial conflicts might run in the 
opposite direction, leading to the subordination, abdication, or redirection of 
a government agency’s commercial responsibilities. For those who champion 
an activist welfare state and are generally wary of government market 
participation, this outcome may appear to be a happy one. But even that 
 
70 Alan Blinder & Richard Fausset, Kentucky Clerk Who Said “No” to Gay Couples Won’t Be Alone 
in Court, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 3, 2015, at A18. 
71 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
72 This is a point the Court concedes in Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 532 (1927), albeit when 
considering the possibility of de minimis private self-dealing. 
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contingent ought to appreciate that the fusion of sovereign and commercial 
tools and legal authorities emboldens the State in problematic ways. The 
fusion enables the government to advance sovereign interests without 
necessarily having to follow the ordinary and onerous processes associated 
with congressional lawmaking or administrative rulemaking. This fusion 
further enables government officials, at times, to act without regard for the 
substantive constraints otherwise imposed on the government qua sovereign. 
Such an ability to bypass procedurally rigorous legislative and regulatory 
pathways and to evade substantive restrictions placed on government officials 
invites abuse and overreach, in ways that should be alarming for libertarians 
and big government types alike. Moreover, just as the subordination of 
sovereign responsibilities to commercial ones may undermine faith in the State, 
the subordination of commercial responsibilities to sovereign ones (and the 
corresponding misappropriation of commercial tools and legal prerogatives) 
may diminish faith in the market. 
Consider another pair of examples from Part I. Recall first the U.S. 
government’s ownership stake in all-but-collapsing automotive and insurance 
firms. Leveraging its position as “owner,” the government induced the auto 
companies to boost its output of environmentally friendly cars.73 Corporate 
managers were also instructed to scale back their plans to move jobs 
overseas.74 In a similar move, the government compelled AIG’s managers to 
withdraw lawsuits against other, equally distraught financial firms.75 In both 
of these instances, the government used its commercial power to recast 
corporate policies. The new policies seemed to advance sovereign, welfarist 
aims over any number of commercial and perhaps fiduciary ones to maximize 
shareholder wealth.76 Of particular importance, the government engineered 
these policy changes using commercial instruments far less democratic, 
procedurally robust, and judicially reviewable than are the mainstays of a 
sovereign subject to the strictures of bicameralism and presentment, and the 
requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act.77 
 
73 Templin, supra note 5, at 1185-86. 
74 Black, supra note 25, at 589-90. 
75 Louise Story & Gretchen Morgenson, Inside the U.S. Bailout of A.I.G.: Extra Forgiveness for 
Big Banks, N.Y. TIMES (June 30, 2010), http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=
9A04E2D6143CF933A05755C0A9669D8B63&pagewanted=all [https://perma.cc/8VUF-NNPG]. 
76 See generally J.W. Verret, Treasury Inc.: How the Bailout Reshapes Corporate Theory and Practice, 
27 YALE J. ON REG. 283 (2010). For discussion of the litigation surrounding government ownership, 
see supra note 25; see also Gretchen Morgenson, Court Casts a New Light on a Bailout, N.Y. TIMES 
(Sept. 27, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/28/business/court-casts-a-new-light-on-a-
bailout.html [http://perma.cc/FRP8-T9WC]; Aaron M. Kessler, AIG Boss Wins Suit but Loses the 
War, N.Y. TIMES, Jun. 16, 2015, at B1. 
77 See Davidoff & Zaring, supra note 12, at 519-20. 
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Again, the misappropriation here, unlike in the Amtrak case study, is from 
the commercial side of the ledger. The government seemingly cast to the side 
its apparent commercial objectives and obligations (both to the American 
taxpayers, to whom a return was promised, and to the rest of the shareholders, 
to whom the United States qua controlling shareholder may well have owed 
some commercial duties), trading on its commercial status and influence to 
advance sovereign, public-regarding interests. 
It may go without saying but the government would likely have been 
slower, more tentative, and in some ways less successful had it sought to effect 
the same industry reforms using only the lawmaking and law-enforcing 
tools typically entrusted to the sovereign. Sovereign tools are less handy 
than commercial ones, and that’s by design: lawmaking and law-enforcing 
are heavily regulated activities subject to far greater and more contentious 
forms of democratic and bureaucratic input. 
Recall as a second example government investment decisions. Here too 
investments may be chosen to promote welfarist objectives, to the apparent 
detriment of the government’s rate of return. Among other things, 
government pension managers might invest in solar energy companies (and 
divest from fossil fuel firms); they might prioritize local firms with the hope 
that government investments lead to local job growth, an expanded tax base, 
and a happier electorate, and they might divest from firms that sell harmful 
products or do business with rogue nation-states.78 
Making policy through investments rather than legislation or regulation 
can no doubt save time and political capital. Pension investment decisions 
may be directed and constrained by statutes and regulations. But the decisions 
themselves are not generally subject to the substantive and procedural 
requirements of lawmaking. Yet such an investing-as-regulating approach to 
governing expands State powers in potentially troubling ways: the government 
employs its commercial tools and resources to reach further and act more 
expediently than it could were only sovereign, coercive tools at its disposal. 
Government market participation serving as a workaround, a way to 
bypass the substantive and procedural laws constraining government market 
regulation (via lawmaking, rulemaking, and adjudication), should raise red 
flags. Indeed, the commingling of sovereign regulatory and commercial 
transactional powers poses similar threats to limited government as does the 
fusion of executive and legislative power, executive and judicial power, and 
public and private power. In all these cases, the combination and 
consolidation of powers limits opportunities for dissent and pushback of the 
sort that deters and constrains abusive or simply imprudent government 
 
78 See Entine, supra note 26. 
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interventions.79 Thus, even if we think there are too many constraints placed 
on government regulators, the solution may well be to reform our regulatory 
processes—through legislation and, perhaps, litigation—not to seek a 
workaround.80 
D. Washington’s Perception of Other Nations’ Sovereign–Commercial Conflicts 
Note too that our rather undertheorized, and heretofore largely 
unproblematic fusion of regulatory and commercial powers mirrors a type of 
expanded, conflicted State power that the United States is quick to deem 
disconcerting in international relations. For instance, the U.S. government 
heavily scrutinizes foreign, State-owned firms seeking to acquire controlling 
interests in American businesses.81 Motivating such scrutiny are concerns that 
foreign, State-owned firms may not be simply (and innocently enough) 
looking to diversify their holdings, seizing upon what they see as good 
business opportunities, as nongovernmental investors would. Instead, we 
worry that State-owned firms are using their purchasing power to advance 
sovereign rather than commercial interests. They may, for instance, be less 
concerned with maximizing profits than with destabilizing U.S. national or 
economic security,82 dictating regulatory policy from abroad (via corporate 
control, as in the bailout examples discussed above), or extracting trade secrets, 
classified information, or intellectual property from American firms.83 
This intensive scrutiny—greater than what the United States applies to 
nongovernmental (and thus more assuredly singularly profit-seeking) 
foreign and multinational businesses interested in acquiring American 
assets84—reflects Congress’s recognition that other nations may possess 
 
79 See Michaels, Enduring, Evolving, supra note 14, at 522. 
80 See Michaels, Privatization’s Pretentions, supra note 2, at 719 (describing government officials 
as engineering workarounds to circumvent laws and rules they find particularly onerous). 
81 See, e.g., infra note 83 and accompanying text. 
82 See, e.g., JOHN F. FRITELLI, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL31733, PORT AND MARITIME 
SECURITY: BACKGROUND AND ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 6-7 (2005) (characterizing some public 
officials’ concerns over foreign, State-owned businesses overseeing U.S. port operations); Eric 
Lipton, Chinese Withdraw Offer for Nevada Gold Concern, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 22, 2009, at B3 (reporting 
U.S. government opposition to a proposal by a firm “controlled by the Chinese government” to 
acquire a Nevada mining operation). 
83 See JAMES K. JACKSON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS22863, FOREIGN INVESTMENT, 
CFIUS, AND HOMELAND SECURITY: AN OVERVIEW 2-3 (2008); Michaels, Fettered Executive, 
supra note 5, at 807. For what it is worth, other nation-states review direct foreign investments and 
transactions too. See DAVID M. MARCHICK & MATTHEW J. SLAUGHTER, CORRECTING A 
PROTECTIONIST DRIFT: GLOBAL FDI POLICY, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS 7-12 (2008) 
(describing the review processes undertaken by the governments of Canada, China, Russia, 
Germany, Japan, Australia, France, and Hungary, among others). 
84 See 50 U.S.C. § 2170(b)(2)(B)(i)(II) (2012) (directing CFIUS to rigorously review proposed 
direct foreign investments by companies owned or effectively controlled by foreign governments). 
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sovereign–commercial conflicts in spades. And those nations may resolve 
their sovereign–commercial conflicts in ways that either distort markets or 
extend their policymaking reach.85 
Sensitive to these possibilities, the U.S. government working group 
charged with reviewing foreign acquisitions has focused intensely on Chinese 
firms owned by or effectively controlled by Beijing. Such firms regularly seek 
to acquire controlling interests in American companies. Surely, most 
acquisitions are pure business decisions. But there is always the possibility that 
the investment is pretextual—and the acquisitions are, in fact, strategic 
components of Chinese foreign policy. 
In recent years, the U.S. working group (called the Committee on Foreign 
Investment in the United States, or CFIUS for short) helped scuttle Chinese 
firms’ plans to acquire an Oregon wind farm86 and various mines in places 
such as Nevada.87 Though seemingly harmless enough, both the farm and 
mines were reportedly too close to U.S. military installations, and thus 
opportune sites from which the Chinese government could—through its 
corporate proxies—conduct surveillance and other intelligence operations 
antithetical to American national security. 
CFIUS has also closely monitored attempts by State-owned or State-
controlled Chinese firms to buy sizable stakes in U.S.-based 
telecommunications and technology companies. Leading Chinese outfits, 
such as Huawei, have had special difficulty breaking into the American 
telecom and tech markets.88 Though CFIUS deliberations are secret, it is 
fairly apparent that CFIUS considers Huawei a cybersecurity threat inclined 
to create or exploit network vulnerabilities.89 And even in cases where CFIUS 
has allowed foreign acquisitions to proceed, the working group has imposed 
restrictions and conditions on the role that foreign owners may play. For 
instance, when Lenovo, partially owned by the Chinese government, acquired 
IBM’s personal computing business line, CFIUS insisted that Lenovo 
 
85 See JACKSON, supra note 83 (describing the U.S. government’s sensitivity to foreign 
governments using direct foreign investment as a tool of economic and national-security statecraft). 
86 Rachelle Younglai, Obama Blocks Chinese Wind Farms in Oregon over Security, REUTERS 
(Sept. 29, 2012), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-china-turbines-idUSBRE88R19220120929 
[https://perma.cc/7JCP-MPP9]. 
87 Lipton, supra note 82. 
88 See Shayndi Raice & Andrew Dowell, Huawei Drops U.S. Deal Amid Opposition, WALL ST. J. 
(Feb. 22, 2011), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748703407304576154121951088478 
[https://perma.cc/C8CB-3CJ6]. 
89 See Steven R. Weisman, Sale of 3Com to Huawei Is Derailed by U.S. Security Concerns, N.Y. 
TIMES (Feb. 21, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/21/business/worldbusiness/21iht-3com.1.
10258216.html [https://perma.cc/MSG9-X496]. 
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officials wall themselves off from all computer sales to federal agencies.90 
Lenovo executives were also required to steer clear of two legacy IBM 
buildings, presumably where classified projects for the American government 
were already underway.91 
Lastly and lest one think that China alone has been singled out, CFIUS 
also insisted on similar stipulations before the French company Alcatel (itself 
closely connected to the French government) could acquire Lucent. Lucent 
ran Bell Labs, which has long performed significant, often classified, work for 
the U.S. government. As a condition of sale, Alcatel’s personnel were 
restricted from any direct involvement in Bell’s operations.92 
(Lest one think these conflicts are inescapable, a nation-state with large 
fiscal reserves could set up a blind investment trust, a preemptive measure both 
to prevent its own officials from politicizing investment policy and to signal to 
the rest of the world that there is no ongoing sovereign–commercial conflict. In 
such situations, the sovereign would bow out gracefully, substantially eliminating 
the conflict.) 
In all, the development of a regulatory regime that scrutinizes, restricts, or 
altogether rejects acquisitions by State-owned or State-controlled firms reflects 
Congress’s canny recognition that other nations’ sovereign–commercial 
conflicts might compromise U.S. market operations, threaten U.S. sovereign 
interests, or expand the influence and power of overseas governments.93 Again, 
it is curious and, perhaps, unsettling that, like many a pot, we have failed to 
realize we too are covered in soot. To be sure, the purely domestic effects of our 
sovereign–commercial conflicts play out very differently from those exploited 
on a grander geopolitical stage. Nevertheless, the effects of our domestic 
sovereign–commercial conflicts are problematic for many of the same reasons 
just discussed—and thus seemingly demand similar regulatory attention. 
 
90 Anthony Michael Sabino, Transactions That Imperil National Security: A Look at the 
Government’s Power to Say “No”, N.Y. ST. B. ASS’N J., Nov.–Dec. 2005, at 20, 22, 24. 
91 Id. 
92 See Michaels, Willingly Fettered, supra note 5, at 826. 
93 See supra notes 82–92. Another domain in which Congress recognizes the distinction 
between sovereign and commercial roles played by foreign sovereigns is that of foreign sovereign 
immunity. Under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, a major exception to the conferral of 
foreign sovereign immunity is referred to as the commercial activity exception. 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1605(a)(2) (2012). Simply stated, foreign governments or heads of state engaged in commercial 
activities may well forgo the privileges of immunity otherwise befitting a recognized sovereign. While 
the scope of the exception presents complicated questions, see, for example, OBB Personenverkehr AG 
v. Sachs, 136 S. Ct. 390, 395 (2015), the key point for our purposes is straightforward: Congress 
appreciates the distinction between a foreign sovereign qua sovereign and a foreign sovereign qua 
market actor. 
2018] Sovereigns, Shopkeepers, and the Separation of Powers 891 
III. STRUCTURAL SEPARATION, REGULATION, AND LEGITIMATION 
Sovereign–commercial conflicts are only exacerbated by federal, state, and 
local governments’ seemingly nonchalant, opaque, inconsistent, and spotty 
approach to their own market participation. Some important domains, 
including government procurement and pension programs, are already 
extensively regulated in ways that suggest a clear appreciation of the problems 
identified in Section II.C. The same is true when it comes to some specific 
government institutions, such as the Tennessee Valley Authority and the U.S. 
Postal Service. But many other analytically or at least substantively similar 
forms of potentially conflicted government market participation barely 
register in legislative, administrative, or judicial deliberations and 
proceedings. Thus we’re left with unevenly and sometimes arbitrarily 
regulated forms of government market participation. This state of affairs 
frustrates systematic study and bedevils would-be reformers; nevertheless, if 
not precisely because of the current splotchiness, a transsubstantive set of 
regulatory protocols ought to be carefully considered. 
Regulation could proscribe, or at least drastically scale back, government’s 
participation in the market. Such a strong intervention would eliminate many 
of the concerns this Article raises. Nonetheless, a widescale ban or broad 
restriction on government market participation would be extreme and 
disproportionate for any number of reasons, including the difficult logistics 
associated with abrupt government disengagement from the market, the fact 
that some forms of government market participation are necessary or highly 
practical, and the undesirability of ready alternatives to government market 
participation (including but not limited to the outsourcing of many 
government services94). 
This leaves us in a place not altogether different from the one 
administrative lawyers found themselves in during the 1940s. Those lawyers 
recognized that federal public administration was a necessary but unruly 
realm, particularly insofar as agency practices were, at that time, varied, 
opaque, and often ad hoc. Ultimately, they succeeded in enacting the 
Administrative Procedure Act (APA).95 The APA brought order and structure 
to the myriad administrative practices that were then being employed by 
federal agencies, cabined some of the more troublesome forms of 
administrative governance, and helped cement the administrative state’s 
constitutional footing. 
 
94 See MICHAELS, CONSTITUTIONAL COUP, supra note 11 (describing the constitutional 
dangers posed by privatization); supra note 2 (detailing how privatization undermines, among other 
things, accountability). 
95 Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.). 
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The APA is hardly perfect. But, as the Supreme Court noted, it did 
yeoman’s work by introducing “greater uniformity of procedure and 
standardization of administrative practice among the diverse agencies whose 
customs had departed widely from each other.”96 Perhaps the signature 
achievement of the APA is its articulation and delineation of two principal 
means of administrative intervention: rulemaking and adjudication,97 and the 
corresponding separation of personnel, tools, and orientation. Such 
separation distanced formal adjudicators and the proceedings over which they 
presided from the rest of the agency charged with making and enforcing 
rules.98 Such separation also helped wall adjudicators off from those agency 
officials who could put to use the spoils of adjudication—namely, the proceeds 
of any fines that transgressors paid and the agency was allowed to keep.99 
Today, given the importance of government market participation, it might 
be time to formally recognize that pervasive practice as a third principal 
category of administrative intervention. Doing so may put us in better 
position to develop (similarly) strong defaults premised on the separation of 
sovereign and commercial functions and personnel; to guide government 
market participation; to make commercialized government more 
transsubstantively uniform; and, quite possibly, to preempt the types of 
structural, constitutional, and normative concerns and challenges with 
government market participation that this Article raises.100 
A. Separation as a Foundational Constitutional Commitment 
Our constitutional and administrative architecture is defined, and 
legitimated, in large part by important lines of separation. We separate 
power and functions along many dimensions—interbranch, federal–state, 
public–private, civilian–military, church–State, and intra-agency. Combinations 
or fusions of executive–legislative, executive–judicial, federal–state, public–
private, civilian–military, church–State, or agency head–civil servant power 
certainly have their selling points. Most significantly, such combinations 
 
96 Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 41 (1950). 
97 See NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon, 394 U.S. 759, 763-64, 771-72 (1969) (plurality opinion); Nat’l 
Petroleum Refiners Ass’n v. FTC, 482 F.2d 672 (D.C. Cir. 1973). 
98 See 5 U.S.C. § 554(d) (2012). 
99 See Marshall v. Jerrico Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 248 (1980). In Jerrico, the Court rejected a 
challenge to a statutory scheme allowing agencies to keep the proceeds of fines levied. Though the 
claimant argued that such a scheme encouraged the assessment of excessive fines, the Court found 
no due process violation, in part because the agency adjudicators who actually imposed the fines 
were organizationally separate from the rest of the agency and thus had no interest in or control 
over the revenue raised by such fines. 
100 One of the closest approximations to what I am proposing is the Federal Acquisition 
Regulation (FAR), a comprehensive blueprint regulating and directing government procurement of 
goods and services. 48 C.F.R pts. 1-53 (2012). 
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enable more potent, better coordinated, and more streamlined exercises of 
government power.101 Yet it is precisely for these reasons that such 
combinations are understood and treated as constitutionally problematic. Lines 
of demarcation and separation limit the power and reach of the government. 
They also more efficiently allocate authority in ways that align specific types of 
power with specific types of institutions.102 And the corresponding checking 
and balancing across those lines of division make the government 
decisionmaking process more inclusive, contentious, and rigorous. 
Not all of these lines of separation have the same constitutional currency. 
Tripartitism and federalism are the most textually, structurally, and 
historically resonant. But we cannot ignore the others, which provide 
additional, different, and reinforcing lines of protection against 
institutional mismatch, corrupt dealings, and overreaching State power. For 
instance, the Constitution makes clear that the lines separating the public 
from the private and the church from the State are important too. These 
lines of separation preserve spheres of private autonomy, limit the power and 
reach of the State, and ensure that civil society is sufficiently independent of 
the State to press and challenge government officials.103 In some ways, these 
particular lines of separation are more basic and more fundamental to 
Western liberal democracy. Indeed, many Western liberal democracies lack 
both a federal structure and the formal separation of executive and 
legislative power. But none of them fails to recognize the limited reach of 
the State; nor does any deny the existence of private property—or fail to 
provide space for the private ordering of personal, spiritual, social, and 
economic affairs.104 
Additionally, separation within agencies, though not deeply ingrained in 
our constitutional culture, ensures that administrative power is disaggregated 
and divided not just between adjudicators and policymakers but also among 
politically appointed agency heads, career, politically insulated civil 
servants, and the public writ large authorized to participate in 
administrative matters. This administrative separation of powers regime 
carries the Framers’ attentiveness to checks and balances into the twentieth 
and twenty-first centuries—a necessary extension once one appreciates that 
so much of modern governing takes place not at the intersection between 
Congress and the President but rather within agencies. In an era when vast 
troves of legislative and judicial power are freely and liberally delegated to 
 
101 See Michaels, Centripetal Forces, supra note 8, at 203. 
102 Id. 
103 See id. at 201. 
104 See generally PAUL STARR, FREEDOM’S POWER: THE TRUE FORCE OF LIBERALISM 
53-58 (2007). 
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agencies, separation and disaggregation within those entities limit the potential 
for government abuse or overreaching and, again, reaffirm the constitutional 
commitment to checking and balancing even as agencies combine previously 
siloed legislative, executive, and judicial power all under one roof.105 
I cannot do adequate justice in this Article to nuanced and complicated 
claims about separation. For these purposes, it is enough to stipulate that 
these many lines of separation are in keeping with our separations of power.106 
And given the frequency with which the sovereign–commercial border is 
traversed, the exercise of sovereign and commercial powers ought to be likewise 
separated as a regulatory, if not a constitutional, matter. After all, the structural 
challenges associated with the sovereign–commercial conflict resemble those 
that motivate the already recognized dimensions of separation. 
First, in Subsection II.C.1, I mentioned that the combination of sovereign 
and commercial responsibilities produces some institutional or organizational 
mismatches, notably with agencies not ideally constituted to carry out 
straightforward commercial responsibilities, and government corporations 
ill-designed to take on multifaceted sovereign tasks. Separation to ensure an 
efficient allocation of responsibilities is an important component of the 
constitutional separation of powers. A legislature that not only declares but 
also makes war would be just fine with respect to the former responsibility, 
but terrible when it comes time for 535 members of Congress to collectively 
act the part of Commander in Chief and issue command directives in real 
time. Likewise, a judiciary that not only interprets but also makes laws would 
be problematic if for no other reasons than because unelected judges, 
purposely kept at some distance from everyday political scrums, do not 
necessarily have a good feel for what kinds of government services and 
interventions the public desires; and because there is no way for the public to 
replace out-of-step, but tenured-for-life, judicial “lawmakers.” Obviously, 
there are other concerns with these combinations—some of which I’ll return 
to in short order—but here I’m focusing only on the specific claim that the 
fusing of discrete powers and responsibilities interferes with an otherwise 
more orderly, disaggregated allocation of authority that aligns particular 
responsibilities with particular institutional structures. 
Second, in Subsection II.C.2, I framed the combination of sovereign and 
commercial responsibilities as a form of debasement of public office. This 
debasement can occur, I posited, when the government market participant 
promotes the commercial at the expense of the sovereign. Again, there are 
analogies to the constitutional separation of powers. The Incompatibility 
 
105 See Michaels, Enduring, Evolving, supra note 14, at 526. 
106 See supra note 8 and accompanying text. For a comprehensive defense of this proposition, 
see MICHAELS, CONSTITUTIONAL COUP, supra note 11, at 153-57. 
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Clause—which prohibits individuals from simultaneously serving in 
Congress and the Executive Branch—is in part motivated by a fear of 
government self-dealing and doubts as to whether any one official can 
faithfully promote both legislative and executive institutional responsibilities. 
Either the legislative or the executive role is likely to be compromised. 
Third, in subsection II.C.3, I characterized the combination of sovereign 
and commercial responsibilities as a threat to limited, democratic government. 
Consolidated power’s threat to liberty is probably the most well-known, 
well-rehearsed, and likely to be mentioned justification for the separation of 
powers and thus needs little elaboration here. Simply stated, the fusion of 
sovereign and commercial power—like the fusion of executive and legislative, 
executive and judicial, federal and state, or public and private power—enables 
particularly potent (and possibly abusive) expressions of State power. 
Thus, precisely because the sovereign–commercial dynamic raises 
substantially similar concerns and threats—and simply does so along a different, 
often overlooked power axis—there may well be reason to extend the traditional 
lines of separation to include the sovereign–commercial one, and to police 
that line accordingly. 
B. The Institutional Design of Sovereign–Commercial Separation 
Engendering greater sovereign–commercial separation can be achieved by 
disentangling commercial activities and personnel from sovereign ones. We 
might, for example, obligate or direct government offices to (i) identify 
themselves as either commercial or sovereign; (ii) limit themselves to using 
only commercial or sovereign tools (in accordance with their ascribed or 
chosen commercial or sovereign identity); and (iii) segregate those personnel 
from colleagues within the organization, department, or agency who are 
advancing the other objectives. 
A government department or unit would, for instance, signal that a 
particular initiative or program is primarily commercial in nature. It would 
then proceed to use only commercial tools, invoke only commercial legal 
protections, and separate its commercial employees from those who are 
promoting sovereign interests. Simply put, government pensions would 
either be tools of Keynesian fiscal policy (at the expense of maximizing 
returns on the investment); or they would be tools of pure investment, 
divorced and expressly insulated from the political and moral imperatives of 
the incumbent government. Government (or NASA intellectual property or 
National Park) policy would either be an extension of government social 
welfare policy—and treated and evaluated as such—or it would be a 
commercial endeavor and, likewise, treated and evaluated as such. 
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This on-the-ground strategy of separation is something that 
administrative law can certainly handle. After all, Congress and the courts 
allow most agencies to make rules and adjudicate controversies, and grant the 
agencies considerable discretion to choose between the two.107 But, beyond 
that choice, Congress and the courts insist that the agencies segregate formal 
adjudicators and formal adjudicatory instruments from the rest of the agency. 
This disaggregation means that government units cannot readily 
misappropriate the tools and resources associated with one responsibility for 
use in the other. Nor can they readily combine the two sets of tools and toggle 
between two distinct legal identities to exercise greater State power than we 
otherwise understand agency officials to possess.108 Perhaps the best example 
of an agency trying to fuse its rulemaking and adjudicatory powers involves 
the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB). In NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon, 
the Board attempted to issue a forward-looking, generally applicable rule via 
a formal adjudicatory order.109 Though no reasoning commanded a majority 
of the Court, six justices insisted that the NLRB could not, in effect, take the 
best of both worlds. Specifically, the Board could not claim rulemaking’s 
broad substantive powers to craft forward-looking, generally applicable rules 
without first going through the inclusive, deliberative rulemaking process as 
prescribed in the APA.110 
Note that this focus on on-the-ground separation may signal a certain 
degree of indifference between the government’s choice to act in a sovereign 
or a commercial manner. That is, the separation I’m suggesting seeks to 
eliminate the problems associated with commingling, toggling between, and 
possibly misappropriating sovereign and commercial tools and identities. But 
it doesn’t tell us whether a given instance of government market participation 
ought to be in furtherance of regulatory or entrepreneurial aims. 
There are, of course, good normative and institutional-design reasons why 
we should not be agnostic as to the government’s choice. Yet thoughts on how 
and where to prioritize the sovereign over the commercial (and vice versa) must 
be taken up at a later date. For present purposes, separation—regardless which 
 
107 See Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 201 (1947) (Chenery II) (leaving 
the choice between proceeding via rulemaking or adjudication largely to the discretion of the 
agencies). 
108 This gets particularly tricky in agencies where top officials are expected to set programmatic 
and enforcement policies and are also called upon to review administrative law judges’ decisions 
implicating those policies. 
109 394 U.S. 759 (1969) (plurality opinion). 
110 Insistence that agencies abide by either the procedures specified for conducting 
adjudications or the procedures specified for promulgating rules commanded the assent of the 
four-justice plurality plus the two dissenting justices. See id. at 775, 779 (Douglas, J., dissenting); id. 
at 780-81 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
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side of the sovereign–commercial divide is preferred—does enough work on its 
own to mitigate the “conflict” harms on which this Article concentrates. 
C. The Logistical and Doctrinal Consequences of Sovereign–Commercial Separation 
As much as I insist upon giving meaning and effect to the separation of the 
sovereign and the commercial, I recognize that such separation poses 
considerable challenges. In what follows, I briefly address three such challenges. 
First, disentangling the commercial from the sovereign is easier said than 
done. Postal inspectors seem very much engaged in a sovereign enterprise, 
whereas letter carriers and post office clerks seem to be quite naturally 
commercially oriented, more like their counterparts at FedEx or UPS than 
like those coworkers who conduct criminal and civil investigations. Likewise, 
government officials supervising the equity ownership aspects of the 2008–2009 
bailouts were arguably more like private, corporate directors and managers 
than they were like their own Treasury colleagues who focused on trade policy 
or international money laundering. To make matters more difficult, some 
Treasury officials wore two hats. They had, for instance, responsibilities with 
respect to both the bailout and trade policy.111 Additionally, there are further 
challenges surrounding government supervisors who think of themselves as 
ordinary employers when it comes to hiring and firing subordinates, but as 
agents of the State when it comes to invoking qualified immunity in response 
to suits brought by regulated parties. 
This blurring is a problem, perhaps a big one. But it isn’t a unique one. 
Administrative law judges tasked with formal adjudicatory responsibilities 
are kept separate from agency inspectors, rulemakers, and prosecutors.112 And 
government lawyers are subject to one set of responsibilities, duties, and 
liabilities when they prosecute suspected criminals but substantially different 
ones when they are engaging in agency policymaking. All of this is to say that 
I recognize the many connections that bind and blend commercial and 
sovereign activity—and that thus make disaggregation difficult. But I also 
recognize that similar entanglements exist elsewhere, and we nevertheless 
endeavor to disaggregate in those contexts too. 
 
111 For example, Neel Kashkari, a Treasury Department official, served both as Assistant Secretary 
of the Treasury for International Economics and Development and as the Department’s point person 
for the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP). See Press Release, U.S. Treasury Department, 
Kashkari Appointed Interim Assistant Security for Financial Stability (Oct. 6, 2008), https://
www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/hp1184.aspx [https://perma.cc/U342-98KU]. 
112 See Michael Asimow, When the Curtain Falls: Separation of Functions in the Federal 
Administrative Agencies, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 759 (1981). 
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Second, one might query whether the sovereign–commercial conflict is 
simply a byproduct of the nondelegation doctrine.113 That is, perhaps the real 
problem is that Congress gives government market participants too much 
discretion and autonomy. Greater congressional guidance may increase the 
democratic legitimacy of government market participation114 and decrease the 
severity of the sovereign–commercial conflict by directing government 
market participants to pursue regulatory or entrepreneurial goals. But even 
if Congress specifies that a government unit should operate like a for-profit 
business, it doesn’t follow under the existing nondelegation doctrine that 
Congress would also be required to expressly restrict that government unit’s 
access to sovereign legal tools and prerogatives. Thus the designated unit 
could very much be singularly focused on profit maximization pursuant to 
a clear congressional directive and yet still employ its sovereign tools, 
invoke its sovereign legal prerogatives, or dangerously combine its 
commercial and sovereign tools and legal identities. In other words, in order 
for the nondelegation doctrine to do all the work that is required in this 
complicated space, that doctrine would have to be interpreted quite 
thickly—with Congress having to do far more than simply specify a 
proverbial “intelligible principle.”115 
Third, one of the more unsettling questions that follows from this 
disaggregation of sovereign and commercial tools, legal authorities, and 
personnel is whether such forced separation means that fully and exclusively 
commercially oriented government market participants ought not be treated 
as state actors for constitutional purposes.116 The mere suggestion that any 
government actor could legally evade constitutional restrictions placed on the 
State might be alarming to some, possibly most, observers. But perhaps we 
ought to consider state action less in terms of public versus private (the 
current framing) and more in terms of sovereign versus commercial. After 
all, fully commercialized government market participants segregated (as I 
propose) from those wielding sovereign tools cannot readily act with the force 
of law nor easily claim any of the privileges of a sovereign agent. Instead, 
those fully commercialized actors might have no greater claim to act 
coercively than do their counterparts employed by private firms. Moreover, 
fully commercialized government market participants are apt to be kept in 
check by any number of private law duties and doctrines that sound in 
corporate and securities law, agency law, tax law, and contracts, property, and 
 
113 See J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928). 
114 See THEODORE J. LOWI, THE END OF LIBERALISM 146, 154-55, 297-99 (2d ed. 1979). 
115 Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc., 531 U.S. 457, 472 (2001). 
116 See generally Charles L. Black, Jr., The Supreme Court, 1966 Term—Foreword: “State Action,” 
Equal Protection, and California’s Proposition 14, 81 HARV. L. REV. 69, 70 (1967). 
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torts—and possibly by whatever disciplining influence the market itself plays 
in regulating individual firms.117 As such, fully commercially oriented 
government market participants may be technically governmental but are not 
acting in the powerful, coercive ways (under the color of state law) that prompt us 
to separate and more stringently regulate government actors in the first place. 
It is also important to appreciate that though this reframing of the state 
action doctrine limits its reach along one dimension (namely, commercially 
oriented government action), it extends state action along another. 
Specifically, this reframing places private contractors and other private 
deputies carrying out sovereign responsibilities or exercising sovereign-like 
powers118 much more firmly in the state action camp. Under my 
reformulation, state actor designation would now turn on an actor’s tools, 
responsibilities, and outlook rather than on what uniform she wears or 
whether she happens to be closely supervised by a government official.119 
Thus injured parties may seek redress against any unconstitutional acts 
contractors, private deputies, or private quasi-regulators might perpetrate in 
conjunction with designing, administering, or carrying out sovereign or 
sovereign-like duties. That’s a big win and reflects, quite possibly, a truer 
application of state action doctrine in a world in which not only the public 
and private but also the sovereign and commercial are blurred. 
CONCLUSION 
Government market participation’s time has come. If anything, we are late 
in recognizing the need for transsubstantive regulatory interventions. Long 
thought of as uninteresting, as an unfortunate necessity, and, perhaps, as the 
most murky and uninviting of bureaucratic backwaters, government market 
participation is a commercial and regulatory dynamo. 
While more work needs to be done to assess the normative implications 
of prioritizing the sovereign over the commercial (or the commercial over the 
sovereign) in any number of regulatory settings, this Article lays the 
groundwork for such inquiries. It does so by situating government market 
participation within a deep and varied philosophical and jurisprudential 
 
117 I recognize that a commercially oriented government market participant will never be truly 
disciplined by the market. Congress is always hovering in the background and is apt to appropriate 
funds if it looks as if a government market participant is in danger of failing. Perhaps more 
importantly, I recognize that neither the market nor, say, the common law is necessarily as protective 
of individual rights as is the U.S. Constitution. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Rethinking State Action, 80 
NW. U. L. REV. 503, 505-06 (1985) (underscoring the challenges to state action doctrine “at a time 
when the public/private distinction is increasingly blurred”). 
118 See supra note 42 and accompanying text. 
119 For a strong critique of the current doctrine and its problematic application in contexts 
involving private contractors, see Metzger, supra note 2. 
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phylum of compound acts seemingly in need of structural disaggregation and 
separation. The compounding of sovereign and commercial tools and powers is, 
I insist, substantially similar to the compounding of any number of other tools 
and powers that the Constitution and subsequent generations of legislators, 
jurists, and regulators have seen fit to split apart into their atomic elements. 
The urgency of such an exploration and, ultimately, the need for 
corresponding remedial interventions only grows in this era of ours 
increasingly defined by CEO-style politics, aggressive regulation by 
dealmaking, and a seeming bipartisan commitment to running government 
like a business. 
 
 
